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INTRODUCTION

Legal services are expensive. Numerous articles, books, and
cases have addressed the cost of legal services, often in terms of
access to legal services, constitutional rights, and professional
obligations. Such lofty concerns are far from irrelevant, but they
are not the focus of this Note. This Note has a more modest
concern: money. Both client and attorney lose when an apparently meritorious claim cannot be pursued because the cost of
maintaining the litigation will equal or exceed the anticipated
recovery, even if the client prevails. The same problem may arise
in defending litigation that is unfounded or tenuous.
A right to recover attorneys' fees can make more practical
the handling of cases which would otherwise have to be maintained at a loss to the client, the attorney, or both. A review of
cases in this area, however, suggests that lawyers sometimes fail
to request attorneys' fees to which they or their clients may be
entitled.
This Note surveys South Carolina statutory and commonlaw provisions that allow the recovery of attorneys' fees, whether
as costs or damages. The list of relevant statutory provisions is
as complete as possible; however, given the legislature's predilection for burying attorneys' fees provisions in South Carolina
Code sections with headings that do not suggest that the statute
addresses fees, and the phenomenal ability of those indexing the
Code to index these sections in a way that it is almost impossible to find them, the author extends no warranties, whether express or implied.
This Note is restricted to South Carolina law and does not
address attorneys' fees recoverable under federal law. Neither
does it cover instances in which attorneys' fees can be collected
only by the State and its agencies and subdivisions,' those in
which insurers exercise their rights of subrogation,2 or criminal
actions3 in which fees are recoverable.
1. See, e.g. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-37-2020, 48-9-1630 (1976).
2. See, e.g., id. § 38-35-100.
3. See, e.g., id. § 16-3-1340.
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THE GENERAL RULE

In South Carolina, as in other jurisdictions, attorneys' fees
are ordinarily not recoverable by any party to an action unless a
statutory provision authorizes such recovery.4 Even if the contract sued upon provides for a recovery of attorneys' fees, the
allowance can be controlled, limited, or forbidden by statute. 5
III.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. Judgment by Confession
According to section 15-35-370 of the South Carolina Code,6
a plaintiff's attorney is allowed a five-dollar fee for obtaining a
judgment by confession of an amount not exceeding one hundred dollars. Given the size of the fee involved, it is easy to understand why there are no reported decisions involving this section and why our courts are not clogged with lawyers seeking to
invoke this particular right.
2. Arbitration
Legal fees are not permissible in an arbitration award unless
the arbitration agreement so provides.7
3. PartitionActions
The court of common pleas may fix attorneys' fees in all
partition proceedings and, as may be equitable, assess such fees
against any or all of the parties in interest.8 The fees are
awarded out of the common fund and the award is left to the
discretion of the court.'
4. See, e.g., Andrews v. Central Sur. Ins. Co., 271 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1967), aff'd,
391 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1968); Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv.'Comm'n, 284
S.C. 105, 326 S.E.2d 395 (1985); Brown v. Spann, 21 S.C.L. (3 Hill) 324 (1837); Save
Charleston Found. v. Murray, 286 S.C. 170, 333 S.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1985).
5. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-413, 37-3-404, 37-3-514 (1976 and Supp. 1986).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-35-370 (1976).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-110 (Supp. 1986). This statute is covered in the discussion
on mechanics' liens. See infra subpt. III.10.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-110 (1976).
9. Smith v. Hawkins, 254 S.C. 278, 175 S.E.2d 824 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999
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In Briggs v. Jackson 0 the South Carolina Supreme Court
rejected the "strict adversary rule"" and held that an allowance
of fees is permissible if it is equitable and if "the attorneys' services inure to the common benefit of the parties in interest."' 2
If the parties to the partition proceeding fail to proceed
with the actual partition, the attorneys to whom the fees were
awarded may, independently of their client's interests or wishes,
petition the court to determine the amount of the fee. If they do,
the court has the power to order the sale of the property involved in the partition as is necessary to satisfy the award. Ordinarily, an award of counsel fees awaits final disposition of a
cause, but not if the parties request an indeterminate delay in
the partition.'"
In order to support an award of attorneys' fees, the court
must make a factual finding that the attorneys' work was helpful
to the prevailing party; it must also determine the extent to
which that party was benefited. 4 It is possible even for the losing party in a partition action to recover for that portion of the
attorneys' fees which were for work that was helpful to those
ultimately determined to be the true owners of the land.'"
4.

State-Initiated Actions

Section 15-77-300 of the Code' 6 provides that in any civil
action brought by the State or by a person contesting a state
action, the court may allow a recovery of attorneys' fees. Such
fees are to be taxed as costs' 7 and may be awarded to the prevailing party (except the State or any political subdivision

(1971); Watson v. Little, 229 S.C. 486, 93 S.E.2d 645 (1956).
10. 275 S.C. 523, 273 S.E.2d 532 (1981).
11. This rule states that there can be no recovery of attorneys' fees against a common fund if the proceedings are adversarial in nature.
12. 275 S.C. at 527, 273 S.E.2d at 535.
13. Id.
14. S & W Corp. v. Wells, 283 S.C. 229, 321 S.E.2d 185 (Ct. App. 1984).
15. Daniel v. White, 272 S.C. 477, 252 S.E.2d 912 (1979).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-300 (Supp. 1986). The statute also permits an award
against any political subdivision of the state.
17. The issue of whether attorneys' fees are or are not "costs" will be addressed
infra at subpt. IV.6. Neither the statutes nor the cases have adopted a consistent
nomenclature.
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thereof)' if the court finds that the State acted without substantial justification in pressing its claim against the private
party and if there exist no special circumstances that would
make such an award unjust. The statute applies to all civil actions except provided.' 9
The statutory language would seem to require the court to
make (and support) an affirmative finding of no "substantial justification" and no "special circumstances." Any award of fees is
within the discretion of the court; the statute is permissive, not
mandatory. The attorney must act in a timely fashion: a petition
for recovery of fees must be filed within thirty days of the final
disposition of the case. 0
Code section 15-77-300 is applicable to actions commenced
on or after July 1, 1985. It does not alter standing requirements

18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-300 (Supp. 1986).
19. The statute states that it is not applicable to "civil actions relating to the establishment of public utility rates, disciplinary actions by state licensing boards, habeas
corpus or postconviction relief actions, child support actions, except as otherwise provided for herein, and child abuse and neglect actions." Id. The exception referred to is
contained in S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-340 (Supp. 1986), concerning blood tests to determine if a paternal or maternal relationship exists between two persons.
Although a full-scale examination of the constitutional issues raised by this statute
are beyond the scope of this Note, § 15-77-340 requires the person upon whom the test is
performed to pay for the costs of such test (if the person upon whom the test is performed prevails in the action, he or she shall be awarded the costs incurred as a part of
the judgment), and Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), may support an argument that
the imposition of such a burden is unconstitutional. The Court found "state action" in a
Connecticut law substantially similar to S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-5-65 (1976). In Connecticut,
failure to support a child resulted in civil proceedings with "quasi-criminal" overtones.
In South Carolina, such failure, if unexcused, is a crime. Id. § 20-7-90. Blood tests can
also be ordered pursuant to § 20-7-954 ("genetic test such as [three examples are given]
or other tests which have been developed ....
). This statute does not have the potential constitutional problems of § 15-77-340.
An equal protection challenge to the Article as a whole seems less tenable. Although
no policy is articulated by the legislature, the exceptions can all be justified as relating to
areas in which the state has a particularly strong interest or areas in which governmental
decisionmaking freedom is extremely important.
Only the private party can recover such fees; if the State prevails, it has no corresponding right to recover. In view of the disparity of power and resources between the
State and most private parties and the ever-present possibility of misuse of the state's
powers and resources, the differing treatment accorded the parties by the statute should
not implicate any equal protection concerns.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-310 (Supp. 1986). Note also that the State has a right to
demand (and may not pay an award of fees without) an itemized accounting of the attorney's fees. Id.
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or immunity defenses, nor does it create new rights of action. 21
Finally, the private party need not await the State's institution
of an action. The private party which prevails may recover attorneys' fees even if he initiates the suit, provided that there has
been some form of state action against him.2"
5. Domestic Relations Cases
(a) Statutes
Attorneys' fees are available to either party in a divorce and
can be awarded pendente lite or as part of a decree.23 They are
similarly available in suits for "separate support and maintenance, legal separation, or other marital litigation.

'24

A fee award in a domestic case creates a lien on any property owned by the person required to pay the other party's fees25
and the attorney may directly petition the family court to enforce payment of the fees 28 even though the award is made to
the client rather than the attorney.27 The necessary procedures
for creating and enforcing the lien are found in the new provi2s
sions governing the equitable distribution of marital property.
(b)

Case Law

It is well settled that an award of fees is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. 29 The award should be made to the
party, not to the attorney. Furthermore, the proceeding must be
brought to a conclusion. Enforcement of orders awarding fees
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-320 (Supp. 1986).
22. Id. § 15-77-300.
23. Id. § 20-3-120 (1976).
24. Id. § 20-3-140. For an example of "other marital litigation" in which attorney's
fees may be allowed, see id. § 20-4-60(c)(6) (order for protection from domestic abuse).
See also infra notes 32-37 and accompanying test.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-145 (1976) (emphasis added).
26. Id. § 20-3-125.
27. See Reid v. Reid, 280 S.C. 367, 312 S.E.2d 724 (Ct. App. 1984), which held that
the award should be made to the party and not to his or her counsel, but also concluding
that although it was error for the trial court to award attorneys' fees directly to the
wife's lawyer, such error was not cause for reversal since the husband suffered no
prejudice thereby.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-477 (Supp. 1986).
29. See, e.g., Nienow v. Nienow, 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504 (1977).
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has been denied in circumstances in which the parties reconciled
prior to completion of the action for divorce 0 or the attorneys'
client died prior to the entry of a final decree."1
Just what constitutes "marital litigation" in which attorneys' fees can be awarded has been the subject of a small body
of litigation. In Schedel v. Schedel32 the supreme court had little
difficulty in deciding that an action to modify support payments
or enforce visitation rights is "marital litigation."
In Darden v. Witham33 the court held that attorneys' fees
could be awarded under current section 20-3-12034 in a declaratory judgment action filed in the circuit court. The action was
filed in order to determine the parties' rights and obligations
under the divorce decree and property agreement. The court
concluded that the action was "essentially an outgrowth of, and
supplementary to, the original 1967 divorce action. Normally the
issues before us would have been determined within the divorce
proceeding." 5
On the other hand, the court has held that a grandparent
petitioning for custody of her grandchild cannot be awarded attorneys' fees under section 20-7-420(2).3 s In addition, the court
determined that the State Department of Social Services is not
liable under section 20-3-120 for the attorneys' fees of indigent
37
parents whose parental rights it is seeking to terminate.
A party claiming attorneys' fees has the burden of showing
that he or she is entitled to fees."' It is not necessary that the
spouse claiming the award be unable to pay his or her attorney
fees; the claimant need only show that' the claim is well
founded.39 In Miller v. Miller ° the court stated that the follow30. In re DePass, 231 S.C. 134, 97 S.E.2d 505 (1957).

31. Louthian & Merritt, P.A. v. Davis, 272 S.C. 330, 251 S.E.2d 757 (1979).
32. 268 S.C. 50, 232 S.E.2d 17 (1977); see also Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. 183, 209
S.E.2d 42 (1974) (husband filed suit to discontinue payments to his wife primarily over
concern that payments were no longer deductible as a result of Hoffman v. Commis-

sioner, 54 T.C. 1607 (1970)).
33. 258 S.C. 380, 188 S.E.2d 776 (1972).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (1976).
35. 258 S.C. at 391, 188 S.E.2d at 780.
36. Snider v. Butler, 278 S.C. 231, 294 S.E.2d 246 (1982) (construing S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 20.7-420 (1976)).
37. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs. v. Hyatt, 277 S.C. 152, 283 S.E.2d 445
(1981).
38. See, e.g. Gainey v. Gainey, 279 S.C. 68, 301 S.E.2d 763 (1983).
39. See Darden, 263 S.C. at 191, 209 S.E.2d at 45; Reid v. Reid, 280 S.C. 367, 377,

312 S.E.2d 724, 729 (Ct. App. 1984).
40. 280 S.C. 314, 313 S.E.2d 288 (1984).
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ing factors relevant in determining the amount of the award:
"[T]he nature, extent and difficulty of services rendered; the
time necessarily devoted to the case; the professional standing of
counsel; the contingency
of compensation, and the beneficial re'4 1
sult accomplished."

6. Transfer of Estates
Section 21-23-6042 of the Code concerns the transfer of estates of minor or mentally incompetent persons when new
county lines are drawn. The probate judge of the new county
becomes the guardian of the estates of those persons who have
become residents of the new county. The section provides that
[a]ny probate judge [of the old county] who fails or refuses to
turn over and deliver the estates shall be liable to pay all costs
of the proceeding, including reasonable counsel fees43 incurred in
obtaining an order forcing the judge to comply with this section.
There are no cases construing this provision.
7. Consumer Protection:Modular Buildings
Section 23-43-30 of the Code is part of the South Carolina
Modular Buildings Construction Act," which was enacted to
protect the public from unsafe modular building units. 45 In addition to authorizing the South Carolina Building Codes Council
to promulgate regulations and standards concerning such
units,' 6 the Act creates a cause of action, "notwithstanding any
other remedies available," for "any person in an individual capacity or on behalf of a class of persons, [who has suffered] damages as a result of a violation of this chapter or applicable
regulations."47

41. Id. at 316, 313 S.E.2d at 290; see also, e.g., Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. 183, 193,
209 S.E.2d 42, 46 (1974) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 253 S.C. 350, 170 S.E.2d 650 (1969)).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-23-60 (1976).
43. Id.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-43-10 to -200 (Supp. 1986).
45. Id. § 23-43-30. "Modular building units" are defined in § 23-43-20, but do not
include mobile homes. Id. § 23-43-20(6).
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-43-40 (Supp. 1986).
47. Id. § 23-43-190.
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"An award [under this Act] may include damages and the
' Allowcost of litigation including reasonable attorneys' fees." 48
ance of attorneys' fees is, by the terms of the statute, discretionary. Since the attorneys' fees are only authorized to be assessed
as part of an "award," the statute would seem to preclude an
award of such fees to the prevailing defendant and is possibly
subject to constitutional challenge under the reasoning 49of Southeastern Home Building & Refurbishing, Inc. v. Platt.

8. Sale of Subdivided Lands
Any purchaser of subdivided lands disposed of in violation
of section 27-29-40, which deals with prerequisites to dispositions of interest in subdivided land, can recover, in addition to
the consideration paid for the property plus six percent interest,
any property taxes paid and reasonable attorneys' fees, less income received from the land in question. 50 The purchaser who
has subsequently disposed of his interest prior to suit can recover the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender of
reconveyance, less interest, since disposition and the amount realized from the disposition. Attorneys' fees are not mentioned in
regard to this class of plaintiffs. While it is arguable that the
omission expresses a legislative intent not to award attorneys'
fees to this class of plaintiffs, such a reading is excessively technical. It would be more logical to regard the description of these
plaintiffs' remedies as an alteration necessitated solely by the
differing circumstances under which currently owning purchasers and nonowning purchasers bring suit.
The statute affirmatively provides for attorneys' fees only
for prevailing purchasers. The statute does not mention a comparable award to prevailing sellers. This discrimination may violate the rule set forth in SoutheasternHome. Many of the statutory provisions for recovery of attorneys' fees allow an award
only to one of the parties. While not all of these provisions are
likely to be found unconstitutional, the possibility of such a rul-

48. Id.
49. 283 S.C. 602, 325 S.E.2d 328 (1985). This case is discussed infra at subpt.
111.10(b).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-29-160(b) (1976) (prerequisites to dispositions of interest in
subdivided land).
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ing should always be kept in mind both as a useful weapon and
as a possible problem.
9. Condemnation Proceedings
The South Carolina General Assembly enacted the initial
eminent domain statute in 187251 and added current section 281-30 in 1924. The current section provides that any corporation
or municipality with the power of eminent domain that institutes condemnation proceedings against any property must either take the property and pay the award or pay to the owner of
the property all expenses incurred in the condemnation proceeding, including a reasonable attorneys' fee. 2 In Ex parte Savannah River Electric Co. 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted this section to mean that no right to compensation
exists until the "condemnor, in the exercise of his option, refuses
' Acto accept the property at the price fixed by the award."54
cording to the court, the statute does not prevent the condemnor
from abandoning the proceeding at any time prior to the fixing
of an award, nor does it penalize the condemnor for exercising
that right. 55
In 1939 the legislature enacted the State Authorities Eminent Domain Act.56 Section 28-3-100 provides that if certain
State authorities abandon, withdraw, or dismiss the condemnation, proceeding "at any time prior to the final conclusion," they
must compensate the owner for all costs and expenses
57

incurred.

Section 28-1-30 applies to "[e]very municipality or other
corporation, upon which the power of eminent domain has been
conferred." 58 Section 28-3-20 applies to certain "State authorities, commissions, boards, or governing bodies established by the
State."59 It would seem, then, that Savannah River Electric is
51. This statute is currently codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-7-10 to -40 (1976) and
addresses condemnation by the United States Government.
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-1-30 (1976).
53. 169 S.C. 198, 168 S.E. 554 (1933).
54. Id. at 204, 168 S.E. at 556.
55. Id.
56. Currently codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3-10 to -140 (1976).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3-100 (1976).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-1-30 (1976).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3-20 (1976).
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applicable and limits the owner's recovery of attorneys' fees to
cases in which the condemnor abandons the proceeding after an
award is made unless the condemnor is a state authority listed
in section 28-3-20.
To make matters even more interesting, Savannah River
Electric is also inapplicable if the exercise of public domain
powers by the State implicates the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.60 Because there has been so little reported litigation in this area, Savannah River Electric continues in effect as unnecessary gloss
on section 28-1-30, producing (in concert with the other statutes) an anomalous situation in which a corporation may have
more flexibility in pursuing or abandoning condemnation proceedings than do some State authorities.
Section 28-1-30 permits an award of costs and expenses to
be entered as a judgment. This section is a "general provision"
and therefore should be applicable to the rest of title 28. The
procedures in sections 28-1-30 and 28-11-30 are entirely different. According to section 28-1-30, the amount of the award is to
be determined by a master and confirmed by the circuit court.
Awards under section 28-11-30, however, are to be determined
by the agency and are defined as "such sum as will, in the opinion of the agency, reimburse [the] owner for his reasonable...
fees."' Chapter 3 of title 28 has no separate provision for the
determination of the amount of the award. Additionally, section
28-1-30 permits the award to be entered as a judgment. Chapter
11 is silent on the point and chapter 3 states that upon abandonment, withdrawal, or dismissal of a condemnation proceeding, the amount of all costs and expenses incurred by the owner
must be paid by the State authority involved and such amount
shall constitute a lien. . upon any award theretofore deposited
in said proceeding by said authority." 2 Neither section 28-11-30
nor section 28-3-100 includes a specific authorization for the entry of a judgment, and the courts have refused to read an au-

60. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-10 to -70 (1976). Recovery of attorneys' fees and other
expenses if this Act applies is covered in id. § 28-11-30(2) (1976). The right to the recov-

ery exists if a court enters a final judgment that the property can't be acquired by condemnation or the proceeding is abandoned.

61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-11-30(2) (1976).
62. Id. § 28-3-100.
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thorization into statutes in which none is contained. 3
Section 28-11-30(3) allows recovery of attorneys' fees in an
inverse condemnation proceeding. Only a prevailing plaintiff or
an attorney effecting a settlement of an inverse condemnation
proceeding can be awarded the fees. Subsection (3) is absolute in
its terms, but must be read in terms of its location in the title
and the prefatory paragraph to the section. Finally, the subsection provides that the amount of the award is such sum "as will,
in the opinion of the court or the agency's attorney," reimburse
the plaintiff for his actual costs and expenses. 4
10. Mechanics' Liens
(a) The Statutes
The mechanics' lien statutes 5 authorizes the allowance of
attorneys' fees as costs in actions to enforce mechanics' liens.
The allowance is available only to a prevailing plaintiff foreclosing on the lien, not to the defendant resisting foreclosure, and is
apparently mandatory inasmuch as it is defined as being part of
the lien itself rather than as an award by the court. The amount
is nevertheless to be determined by the court and (when added
to court costs awarded) may not exceed the amount of the lien.
(b)

The Southeastern Home Decision

The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Southeastern Home Building & Refurbishing, Inc. v. Platt66 declared the

attorneys' fees provisions of sections 29-5-10 and 29-5-20 uncon63. See South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Schrimpf, 242 S.C. 357, 131 S.E.2d 44
(1963).
64. Additional provisions regarding condemnation and attorneys' fees are scattered
throughout the Code. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-15-70 (1976) (Low Country Resources,
Conservation and Development Authority-rights-of-way and easement); id. § 48-17-70
(Crossroads of History Resource, Conservation and Development Authority-rights-ofway and easements); id. § 55-15-110 (condemnation and inverse condemnation involving
airports).
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-5-10 (Supp. 1986); id. § 29-5-20 (1976).
66. 283 S.C. 602, 325 S.E.2d 328 (1985). Prior to this decision, the court had af-

firmed an award of attorneys' fees in a case in which the constitutionality of the 1962
Code provisions §§ 45-251 and -259 was apparently not raised. Hodge v. First Fed. Sav.
and Loan Ass'n, 267 S.C. 270, 227 S.E.2d 310 (1976).
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stitutional. The court found the differing treatments of prevailing plaintiffs and defendants to have "no rational relationship to
any legitimate State goal."'67 It rejected arguments that the distinction was justified by "the goal of giving priority to claims
regarding work performed and materials furnished," "easing the
pocketbooks of laborers and materialmen," compensating "the
plaintiff for being the one who brings the parties into court and
bears the burden of proof," or the fact "that attorneys' fees are
'costs' of the plaintiff rather than a penalty against the
defendant."68
The court distinguished Coker v. Pilot Life Insurance Co.6 9
on the grounds that the statute involved therein required bad
faith and the mechanics' lien statute does not.70 This distinction
was not, however, the justification of the Coker court. The defendant therein argued that the statute was "a special law where
a general one can be made applicable. '71 The court responded
that the law was a general one since it applies "uniformly to all
persons in the class involved. ' 72 Coker is thus distinguishable
from Southeastern Home in that the defendant in the latter
case argued a different kind of equal protection violation-that
the classes created by the law were unconstitutional-not that
to treat all members of the class in the same
the law failed
3
manner.
The court also distinguished Bradley v. Hullander,74 which
involved a violation of the Uniform Securities Act, again relying
on the requirement of bad faith in securities fraud cases. 7 5 As in

Coker, there is no reference in Bradley to bad faith or, for that
matter, to any other justification for the classification. The
Bradley court held that "the costs and attorneys' fees provisions
of section 35-1-1490(2) bear a reasonable relation to the legitimate policy objectives of the State

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

. .

.and do not violate the

283 S.C. at 603, 325 S.E.2d at 329.
Id., 325 S.E.2d at 329.
265 S.C. 260, 217 S.E.2d 784 (1975).
283 S.C. at 604, 325 S.E.2d at 329.
265 S.C. at 268, 217 S.E.2d at 788.
Id., 217 S.E.2d at 788.
Id., 217 S.E.2d at 788.
277 S.C. 327, 287 S.E.2d 140 (1982).
Southeastern Home, 283 S.C. at 604, 325 S.E.2d at 329.
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Equal Protection Clause." 6 The court did not, however, explain
those policy objectives. It is interesting to note that the court
cited as one of the "numerous instances where . . .attorneys'

fees are allowed to plaintiffs alone" the mechanics' lien statute
77
that Southeastern Home declared unconstitutional.
There are two aspects of Southeastern Home that are particularly unsettling. The first is the court's use of its own precedent. The court distinguished Coker and Bradley by pointing to
a factor (i.e., bad faith) that was not relied on, mentioned, or
even hinted at in those decisions. This sort of exegesis undercuts
both the principle of stare decisis and the court's own authority
by introducing an element of capriciousness into the adjudication of constitutional issues. Furthermore, the court completely
ignored its own opinion in Bradley, which stated that allowance
of attorneys' fees only to successful plaintiffs does not, in and of
itself, violate the right to equal protection of the law. 78
Second, the court, by limiting itself to those justifications
for the statutory classifications actually raised by counsel,
reduces constitutional litigation to an exercise in which the ingenuity of plaintiff's counsel in advancing possible justifications is
matched against defendant counsel's ingenuity in demonstrating
that the proffered justifications are inadequate. The United
States Supreme Court has held that as long as a legislature
could rationally conclude that a particular classification is nationally related to a permissible objective, that would be sufficient; it is irrelevant whether that particular conclusion was relied upon by the legislature. 7 There is no point in sending a law

back to the legislature so that it can reenact it and simply supply a different justification. Only if the classification rises to the
level of invidious discrimination is there an equal protection
problem. 0 That this standard is designed to give a legislature
great freedom in the implementation of social and economic legislation is clear from the fact that since 1955 there has been only
one Supreme Court decision that has held a law of this nature to

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

277 S.C. at 331, 287 S.E.2d at 142.
Id., 287 S.E.2d at 142.
Id. at 331, 287 S.E.2d at 142.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
Id. at 489.
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be unconstitutional 8 ' and that decision was subsequently overruled.82 Under the invidious discrimination test, the statute
could be found to be constitutional. As the court has noted,
there are "numerous instances" in which attorneys' fees are
awarded only to prevailing plaintiffs8 3 and the reasoning in
Bradley, if applied in Southeastern Home, would have supported a conclusion that sections 29-5-10 and 29-5-20 are not
unconstitutional.
(c) The Sentry Engineering Decision
Whatever its analytical shortcomings, Southeastern Home
did provide a clear rule. The court in Sentry Engineering &
Construction, Inc. v. Mariner's Cay Development Corp.s4 destroyed this clarity. The court held that a contract clause reserving all rights and remedies listed in the contract or "otherwise
imposed or available by law .

.

.must have contemplated...

the security of a lien and eventual foreclosure, a procedure
which gives the prevailing party a right to attorneys' fees."85 It
concluded by stating:
A provision of the State Arbitration Act88 provides that a
party may proceed with arbitration and perfect concurrently
its mechanic's lien rights. In this we perceive a legislative intent to promote arbitration of contract disputes. To deny fees
where liability is arbitrated would discourage arbitration.
We agree with the reasoning in Harrisand hold that where
a contract providing for arbitration includes a reservation of
rights and the lienor must bring a foreclosure action to enforce
an arbitration award, an award
of attorney's fees is proper
87
under [Code section 29-5-410].

The decision of the court in Sentry Engineering on attor-

81. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
82. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976).
83. Bradley, 277 S.C. at 330, 287 S.E.2d at 142. The Bradley opinion is discussed
further infra at subpt. III.15(a) (Securities Transactions).
84. 287 S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985).
85. Id. at 355, 338 S.E.2d at 636.
86, Citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-220 (Supp. 1984) (current version at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-48-220 (Supp. 1986)).

87. 287 S.C. at 355, 338 S.E.2d at 636 (citation omitted).
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neys' fees is based entirely on an Oregon case, Harris v. Dyer.8
It is particularly interesting because of what it omits. First, the
reason that the Oregon court awarded attorneys' fees is because
the remedy of foreclosure is "a procedure which in Oregon gives
the prevailing party a right to attorney fees.""" With the exception of the words "in Oregon," the entire sentence is a verbatim
quote from the Oregon decision. 0 The omission seems trivial,
but it radically alters the decision in Harris,impressing it in the
service of a case to which it is not applicable. Attorneys' fees
were recoverable in Oregon because there was a statute permitting their recovery.9 No comparable statute exists in South Carolina; the supreme court declared it unconstitutional in Southeastern Home.
Thus, in Oregon, attorneys' fees are recoverable in arbitration proceedings if the contract reserves all rights or remedies
imposed or available by law. Because arbitration is such a remedy and therefore falls within the statutory procedure for enforcement of a lien which culminates in a statutory right to attorneys' fees the Oregon court stated: "[W]e conclude that the
contract between the parties reserves to the prevailing party in a
lien foreclosure suit the full 'reasonable' attorneys' fees available
in such a suit under [Oregon statute section] 87.060(4), determined to include those fees 'reasonable' for the arbitration proceeding ...
*92 The award is grounded entirely on the statute;
any doubts as to this are removed by the court's statement that
the sum of attorneys' fees recoverable in a suit following arbitration cannot exceed "what would be 'reasonable' if all issues had
been litigated in the foreclosure proceedings"9' 3 and by the fact
that "had the dispute ended with the award, or with its enforcement under the arbitration statute, there would be no right to
attorneys' fees for [article 7.6.1 of the contract] to reserve. '94
The court did not mention, much less discuss, these limitations
in Sentry Engineering.Harris is firmly grounded in a relevant
statute. Sentry Engineeringhas been severed from the statutory

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

292 Or. 233, 637 P.2d 918 (1981).
Id. at 238, 637 P.2d at 920 (emphasis added).
287 S.C. at 355, 338 S.E.2d at 636.
Op. REv. STAT. § 87.060 (Supp. 1984).
292 Or. at 238-39, 637 P.2d at 921 (emphasis added).
Id. at 239, 637 P.2d at 921.
Id.
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moorings needed to anchor it properly by the court's prior
Southeastern Home decision.
The attorneys' fee award in Sentry Engineering cannot be
justified by the reference to section 29-5-410.11 It is unlikely that
the legislature intended to include attorneys' fees in a section
entitled "Costs" when it made a separate statutory provision for
them in sections 29-5-10 and 29-5-20. Furthermore, even assuming that "costs" could encompass attorneys' fees, section 29-5410 seems to reject that inclusion by limiting itself to "[tihe
costs, in all other respects," that is, the costs not already covered
by another statutory provision. Finally, even if assumed arguendo that section 29-5-410 might possibly be construed to include attorneys' fees, this construction, as applied to Sentry Engineering's facts, is wholly inconsistent with a legislative
mandate established elsewhere in the Code. The court supports
its award of attorneys' fees with a passing reference to the State
Arbitration Act and its policy of encouraging arbitration. There
is no doubt that the legislature intended to encourage dispute
resolution through arbitration. The legislature, however, has expressly rejected the reasoning used by the court; section 15-4811091 states that attorneys' fees may not be awarded in arbitration unless the arbitration agreement specifically provides for
them.
Sentry Engineering does not affect the holding of Southeastern Home. Unless the court expands its narrow ruling in
Sentry Engineering in future decisions, a lienholder who forecloses on the lien cannot recover his attorneys' fees, but a
lienholder under a contract providing for an arbitration procedure can recover attorneys' fees incurred in both the arbitration
and the foreclosure proceedings. The Sentry Engineering decision will encourage arbitration, which is the court's intention;
however, absent the limits imposed by Harris,it will encourage
arbitration as an addition to, and not a substitute for, litigation.
The net result will be an increase in both the length and the cost
of resolving mechanics' lien disputes, a result the Harris court
foresaw and tried to avoid.

95, S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-5-410 (1976).
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-110 (Supp. 1986).
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11. Freedom of Information Act
A prevailing plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under the
South Carolina Freedom of Information Act 97 may recover attorneys' fees according to statute. If a plaintiff prevails in part, he
may be awarded full or partial fees. The prevailing defendant
may not recover fees.
The statute provision allowing these fees was applied and
interpreted by the court in Society of Professional Journalists
v. Sexton. 8 The court held that the statute permits recovery of
attorneys' fees in declaratory judgment actions, even though the
statute specifically mentions only injunctive relief.9 9 The court
further noted that an award is within a trial court's discretion. 100
Despite the fact that the statute awards fees only to prevailing plaintiffs, the Sexton court's approval of the policy behind
the statute 1 ' suggests that Southeastern Home would not be a
problem should an agency ever challenge the attorneys' fees provisions on equal protection grounds.
12. Dissenting Shareholder Rights
Section 33-11-270(i)(7)' 02 allows the court, in its discretion,
to award dissenting shareholders expert and attorney fees anl
expenses in an action to determine the fair value of the dissenting shares if the corporation and the shareholders cannot agree
on a price. The award is made against the corporation and to the
shareholders unless the court finds that the action of such shareholders in failing to accept such offer (i.e., the corporation's offer
to purchase the dissenting shares at a certain price) "was arbitrary, vexatious, or otherwise not in good faith.'

0

3

The statute

adds that in exercising its discretion, the court may also consider
whether the fair value of the shares as determined by the court

97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-10 to -110 (Supp. 1986).
98. 283 S.C. 563, 324 S.E.2d 313 (1984).

99. Allowance of fees under the statute is permissive, not mandatory. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 30-4-100 (Supp. 1986).
100. 283 S.C. at 568, 324 S.E.2d at 315-16.
101. The policy is "to encourage agencies to comply with FOIA requests." Id., 324
S.E.2d at 316.
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-270(i)(7) (1976).
103. Id.
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"materially exceeds" the corporation's offer, the corporation's
failure to make any offer, or the corporation's failure to 10institute
4
the action itself as required by section 33-11-270(i)(1).
In Metromont Materials Corp. v. Fennell0 5 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld an award of $7500 in attorneys' fees
(plus other expenses) to the dissenting shareholders against an
attack by those who claimed that the award was inadequate. Despite the fact that Metromont offered $475.57 per share and the
final court-determined fair value was $745.76 per share, the
court rejected the inadequacy argument because "services rendered in this action are practically inseparable from the services
rendered in the related Federal actions [which were dismissed]
and respondents have produced no evidence which would justify
our increasing the amounts awarded by the trial judge."' 6
In Dibble v. Sumter Ice & Fuel Co.'0 7 the court affirmed a
trial judge's finding that a cause of action alleging the "freezeout" of a minority stockholder did not come under section 3311-270 and that, therefore, the court could not award attorneys'
fees.
13. Shareholder Derivative Actions
The statute addressing derivative actions differs from most
of the other statutory provisions regarding attorneys' fees in
that its clear purpose is to discourage suits. Section 33-11290(c) 10 provides that in a corporate shareholder's derivative action, if the court finds upon final judgment "that the action was
brought without reasonable cause," it may require the plaintiff
to pay the defendant's expenses, including attorneys' fees. There
is no comparable provision for payment of the plaintiff's ex-

CODE ANN. § 33-11-270(i)(1) (1976) provides in part:
If within the thirty (30) day period [for demand for redemption of shares
by dissenting shareholders], a dissenting shareholder and the corporation do
not agree as to the fair value of the shares:
(1) The corporation shall, within thirty (30) days thereafter, institute an
action in the court of the county in which its registered office is located for a
determination of the fair value of the shares ....

104. Id. S.C.

Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.

270 S.C. 9, 239 S.E.2d 753 (1977).
Id. at 25, 239 S.E.2d at 761-62.
283 S.C. 278, 322 S.E.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1984).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-290(c) (1976).
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penses by the defendant if the plaintiff prevails.
14. Derivative Action by a Limited Partner
In contrast to the legislative policy regarding shareholder
derivative actions, the legislature apparently encourages derivative actions by limited partners. Plaintiffs who are wholly successful, partially successful, or who receive "anything

. .

. as a

result of a judgment may recover attorneys' fees."' 109 If the plaintiff recovers an amount in excess of his reasonable expenses, he
must remit that amount to the limited partnership. The statute
makes an award of expenses permissive rather than
mandatory. 110
There is no comparable provision which is applicable to
suits by a partner against a general partnership. The statutory
scheme as a whole shows a legislative intent to discourage derivative actions instituted in the name of the corporations, to encourage such actions if a limited partnership is involved, and to
take no position regarding derivative actions in the name of a
general partnership. The first and last viewpoints are easy to
justify. There is a substantial likelihood of frivolous or nuisance
actions by a minority shareholder absent the existence of sanctions designed to discourage such suits. In contrast, the partners
of a general partnership usually have no incentive to harass the
management of the partnership with a frivolous derivative action-they are the management.
The allowance of an attorneys' fee award only to prevailing
plaintiffs in a limited partnership derivative action is more difficult to support. There is no South Carolina legislative history on
this point. Our statute is identical to section 1004 of the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act,"' but the comments of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
are singularly unhelpful. The comment to section 1004, in its entirety, is as follows: "[Section] 1004 is new."' 1

2

A limited partner

in a limited partnership occupies a position analogous to that of
a minority shareholder in a corporation. There exists the same

109.
110.
111.
112.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-42-1840 (1976).
Id.
REV. UNiF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT

§ 1004, 6 U.L.A. Supp. 277 (1986).

Id. § 1004 comment.
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possibility of frivolous suits designed only to harass or impede
management. Limited partnerships themselves are more analogous to corporations than to general partnerships and there
seems to be little reason to protect the management of one and
not the management of the other.
15. Securities Transactions
(a) Protection for the Buyer
The South Carolina Uniform Securities Act' 3 awards the
prevailing plaintiff attorneys' fees in a case involving an offer or
sale of securities "by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact"'1 4 or in any
case involving a violation of certain specified sections of the
Act.115
An award of attorneys' fees under section 35-1-1490(2) was
held constitutional in Bradley v. Hullander."6 The court noted
that statutes are presumptively valid, citing Missouri, Kansas &
Texas Railway v. Cade" 7 and Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society"" for the proposition that statutes which allow recovery of fees only to successful plaintiffs are constitutional. The court reasoned, "If the classification is otherwise reasonable, the mere fact that attorneys' fees are allowed to
successful plaintiffs only, and not to successful defendants, does
not render the statute repugnant to the 'equal protection'
clause.""' It further noted that requiring the unsuccessful defendant to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees is a legitimate tool
in enforcing the underlying public policy of the statute. 20
The court also cited an Illinois case in which the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a similar state securities act stating:

113. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (1976).

114. Id. § 35-1-1490(2).
115. Id. § 35-1-1490(1).
116. 277 S.C. 327, 287 S.E.2d 140 (1982).
117. 233 U.S. 642 (1914).
118. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
119. 277 S.C. at 330, 287 S.E.2d at 141 (citing Cade, 233 U.S. at 650) (citations
omitted).
120. Id. at 331, 287 S.E.2d at 142.
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We know of no constitutional right of appellant which is denied him by the act. The Legislature has in several other instances authorized the plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees in addition to other damages, and we do not know of any instances
in which it has been held unconstitutional."'
In concurring with the Illinois court's rationale and findings, the

Bradley court stated:
There are numerous instances where a member of a certain class may maintain an action and attorneys fees are allowed to the successful plaintiff alone, such as: claims by insured against insurers for bad faith denial of policy claims.
Claims involving mechanic's
liens, and claims under the Fed122
eral Truth-in-Lending Act.

(b)

Protection for the Seller

The Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act' 23 allows a recovery at
law (as well as alternative remedies in equity) for damages,
costs, and attorneys' fees to a person who sells a security to
"[a]ny offeror who. . purchases an equity security in connection with a take-over bid not in compliance with this chapter" or
in connection with a take-over bid by means of a material untruth or omission.

124

16. Bailee Protection and Liability
If a claimant cannot produce a necessary document in order
to obtain delivery of goods from a bailee and brings an action
against the bailee to force delivery, the court may, in its discretion, order the claimant to pay the bailee's reasonable costs and
counsel fees. 12 5 As the provisions of subsection (2) makes clear,
this section is designed to discourage bailees from making deliveries unless they receive the proper documents.'2 The attorneys'

121. Morrison v. Farmers' Elevator Co., 319 Ill. 372, 377, 150 N.E. 300, 332 (1925).
122. 277 S.C. at 330-31, 287 S.E.2d at 141-42 (citing Morrison v. Farmers' Elevator

Co., 319 Ill. 372, 150 N.E. 330 (1925)) (footnotes and citations omitted).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-10 to -130 (1976).
124. Id. § 35-2-110(2).
125. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-7-601(1) (1976).
126. Id. § 36-7-601(2).
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fee provision furthers this policy by enabling the bailee to avoid
the situation of liability for misdelivery if he delivers the goods
to a claimant not entitled to receive them and substantial legal
costs if he refuses to deliver them.
17. Disposition of Collateral by a Secured Party
A secured party may dispose of the collateral after default
the
debtor and use the proceeds to satisfy his expenses in
by
obtaining and disposing of the collateral, including "to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law,
the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the
secured party.'

12

7

Expenses, including attorneys' fees, take pri-

ority over the satisfaction of any indebtedness, whether of the
secured party or of one holding a subordinate security interest.1 28 In addition, a debtor may only redeem collateral after default and prior to disposition by the secured party if reasonable
attorneys' fees and legal expenses are paid. 129 Technically, these
provisions do not create a right to receive attorneys' fees; they
merely provide statutory support for the enforcement of a contractual term allowing fees and require the courts to determine
30
the reasonable fee.1

18. Consumer Transactions
(a) Credit Sales and Leases
Section 37-2-413 of the Code' 31 limits recovery of attorneys'
fees after default on a consumer credit sale or consumer lease to
fifteen percent of the unpaid debt after default. No attorneys'
fees are recoverable if the attorney is "a salaried employee of the
seller, or of the lessor or his assignees."' 132 It is unclear if the
legislature intended to restrict the assignee limitation to lessor's
127. Id. § 36-9-504.
128. Id. § 36-9-506.
129. See id. §§ 36-9-504(1)(a), -506.
130. The statute ws cited in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Hammond, 285 S.C.
277, 330 S.E.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1985), in which the court upheld a fee award of $26,000, or
approximately 13% of the $206,731 outstanding debt.
131. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-413(1) (1976).
132. Id.
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assignees or if it includes assignees of both sellers and lessors.
The grammatical structure suggests the former, but it may not
be wise to put too much weight on a legislative comma. Subsection (2) of section 37-2-413 refers to section 37-10-102(a) for attorneys' fees in connection with closing and title in consumer
credit sales secured in whole or part by a lien on real estate.133
(b)

Consumer Loans

Section 37-3-404 of the Code'34 also limits attorneys' fees on
consumer loans to fifteen percent of the unpaid debt after default. The attorney may not be a salaried employee of the
lender. There is no restriction as to attorneys employed by assignees of lenders. This leaves open the possibility that if the
loan is assigned and the consumer defaults, the assignee can use
an attorney who is a salaried employee and still recover attorneys' fees. Subsection (2) of this section parallels section 37-2413(2). 85
(c)

Supervised Loans

Any provision for collection of attorneys' fees from the
debtor "[w]ith respect to a supervised loan with a loan finance
charge in excess of eighteen percent per year and in which the
principal is $1,000 or less" is unenforceable.' 36 A supervised loan
is a consumer loan on which the finance charge exceeds eighteen
1
percent per year.

7

(d)

Unconscionability

Section 37-5-108(6) of the Code 38 provides for attorneys'
fees in suits relating to unconscionability in consumer credit
transactions. The statute covers both unconscionability in the
terms of the agreement and in conduct engaged in collecting a
133. Id. 37-2-413(2).
134. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-404(1).
135. Id. § 37-3-404(2). There are similar restrictions on the financing of the retail
sales of motor vehicles. See id. § 56-17-30(h).
136. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-514 (1976).
137. Id. § 37-3-501.
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-108(6) (1976).
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debt arising from such transaction. If the court finds unconscionability, it "shall award reasonable fees to the attorney for the
consumer or debtor."139 The standard involved in awarding fees
to a defendant is not the same: "If the court does not find unconscionability and the [plaintiff].

.

. brought or maintained an

action he knew to be groundless, the court may award reasonable fees to the attorney for the [defendant] .' '140 The allowable
attorneys' fees are not limited by the amount of the recovery.
The legislative policy in this situation is to encourage suits
by consumer-debtors. This is apparent from the provisions that:
(a) Make the award of attorneys' fees mandatory if the
plaintiff prevails and discretionary if the defendant does.
(b) Impose a much greater burden on the defendant. Not
only must the court find that there was no unconscionability
and that the action was groundless, the court must also find
that the plaintiff knew the action was groundless. Constructive
knowledge is apparently insufficient here; the statute requires
that the plaintiff actually knew his claim was frivolous.
(c) Do not restrict the amount of the recovery. The provision is of no help to the defendant since, if he prevails, there
will, ipso facto, be no recovery against which to measure the
fees. The provisions are designed to encourage the plaintiff
whose possible damages or debt obligation is less than the legal
expenses involved in prosecuting the claim. The statute ensures that the consumer not be forced to choose between acand financial detceding to unconscionability on the one hand 141
riment for bringing the action on the other.
Finally, unlike many attorneys' fees provisions,142 this sub139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. The United States Supreme Court has recently held that, in civil rights litigation, award of attorneys' fees need not be limited by the amount of the plaintiffs' recovery. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986). The Court relied in part on
legislative history, but did so in a somewhat ex post facto fashion. The primary rationale
for the Court's conclusion seems to be an argument that the benefits of a civil rights
action inure to persons other than the plaintiffs by indicating civil and constitutional
rights and cannot be equated with the amount of the pecuniary recovery. Id. at 2694-97.
There is no reason why this reasoning cannot be extended beyond the area of civil
rights litigation to include all cases in which a "plaintiff seeks to vindicate important
civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms," id. at
2694, or "damages awards do not reflect fully the public benefit advanced" by the litigation, id. at 2695.
142. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (1976) (discussed supra at subpt. 111.5).
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section directs that the fees be awarded directly to the attorney,
not the prevailing party. 4"
(e) Creditor Nondisclosure
A creditor who "fails to disclose information to a person entitled to the information under this title is liable to that person"'144 in the manner specified in the statute145 plus the costs of
the action and "reasonable attorneys' fees as determined by the
1 46

court."'

(f) The Omnibus Provision
Subsection (8) of section 37-5-202 is the legislature's gift to
the consumer-debtor and his attorney. It authorizes the recovery
of costs and attorneys' fees in any action "in which it is found
that a creditor has violated this title.' 1 47 Title 37 covers credit
sales, 48 loans,' 49 and credit insurance. 50 As far as restricted

lenders and restricted loans are concerned, chapter 29 of title 34
overrides title 37 if the two are inconsistent, except that section
37-3-512 overrides title 34.151 A violation of chapter 29 does not
create a private cause of action (unless one is implied by the
courts), and there is no provision for attorneys' fees.
The subsection provides that the amount of the recovery on
behalf of the consumer does not control the amount of attorneys' fees that can be awarded. Since subsection (8) applies to
any violation of title 37, the consumer's recovery should not control attorneys' fees in any action under title 37 even though only
section 37-5-108(6) specifically states that the amount of recovery does not control.

143. Id.

§

144. Id.

§ 37-5-203(1).

145. Id.

§

37-5-108(6).
37-5-203(1)(a).

146. Id. § 37-5-203(1)(b).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. 8 37-5-202(8).
Id. §8 37-2-101 to -605.
Id. §8 37-3-101 to -605.
Id. §§ 37-4-101 to -304. Consumer credit insurance is defined in id. § 37-4-103.
Id. § 37-1-106.
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19. Insurer Bad Faith
Code section 38-9-320(1)152 provides for recovery of attor-

neys' fees for an insurer's failure to pay a claim without reasonable cause or in bad faith in addition to other amounts recoverable. In order to support an award of attorneys' fees, the trial
court must make an affirmative finding that the refusal to pay
insurance benefits was "without reasonable cause or in bad
M
faith. 1 5 3 The court, rather than the jury, makes this finding.
Once the court makes this finding, it is not in any way binding
upon an appellate court, which "has jurisdiction to find the facts
in accordance with its views of the preponderance of the evidence."" 5 The finding must be supported by the evidence and
may be based on "relevant evidence adduced at trial.
as any other competent evidence. '"156

. .

as well

The statute does not imply that every prevailing plaintiff is
entitled to attorneys' fees.157 If, for example, the refusal is based
on "a legal issue of novel impression, an attorneys' fee award [is]

152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320(1) (1976). The statute provides as follows:
In the event of a claim, loss or damage which is covered by a policy of insurance or a contract of a nonprofit hospital service plan or a medical service
corporation and the refusal of the insurer, plan or corporation to pay such
claim within ninety days after a demand has been made by the holder of the
policy or contract and a finding on suit of such contract made by the trial
judge of a county court or court of common pleas that such refusal was without
reasonable cause or in bad faith, the insurer, plan or corporation shall be liable
to pay such holder, in addition to any sum or any amount otherwise recoverable, all reasonable attorneys' fees for the prosecution of the case against the
insurer, plan or corporation. The amount of such reasonable attorneys' fees
shall be determined by the trial judge and the amount added to the judgment.
In no event shall the amount of the attorneys' fees exceed one third of the
amount of the judgment or the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars, whichever
is less.
Id.
153. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 275 S.C. 276, 278, 269 S.E.2d 769, 770
(1980); see also Flynn v. Nationvide Mut. Ins. Co., 281 S.C. 391, 315 S.E.2d 817 (Ct.
App. 1984).
154. Flynn, 281 S.C. at 393, 315 S.E.2d at 819.
155. Baker v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 S.C. 609, 613, 235 S.E.2d 300, 302 (1977) (citing
Townes Assocs. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976)); see also Brown
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 275 S.C. 276, 269 S.E.2d 769 (1980); Flynn v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 231 S.C. 391, 315 S.E.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1984).
156. Flynn, 281 S.C. at 393, 315 S.E.2d at 819.
157. Madden v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 264, 251 S.E.2d 196 (1979).
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improper."15 8 Similarly, an award is improper if the insurance
company raises a bona fide defense.""9
The defense, however, must be bona fide. In Flynn v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,6 0 the court ruled that an "insurer's claim of arson based on mere suspicion does not provide
a reasonable basis for denial of coverage." The court also
awarded attorneys' fees in Blackburn v. Government Employees
Insurance Co. 6 ' because the insurer raised as a defense an issue
it had already litigated and lost in the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
The theory under which the plaintiff seeks to impose liability is critical. Attorneys' fees are available only in a breach of
contract action; punitive damages, but not attorneys' fees, can

158. Myers v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 70, 74, 302 S.E.2d 331, 333
(1983) (scope of personal injury protection motorcycle exclusion); see also Wiggins v.
Travlers Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 211 (D.S.C. 1979), afl'd without op., 636 F.2d 1215 (4th
Cir. 1980) (whether phrase "loss of income due to disability" includes times lost from
work while visiting the doctor); Nelson v. United Fire Ins. Co., 275 S.C. 92, 267 S.E.2d
604 (1980) (whether insured who sold land on which house was situated continued to
have insurable interest).
159. Belk v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 271 S.C. 24, 244 S.E.2d 744 (1978) (interpretation of ambiguous statute); see also Wiggins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 211
(D.S.C. 1979); Green v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 287 S.C. 197, 336 S.E.2d 478 (1985);
Waites v. South Carolina Windstorm & Hail Underwriting Ass'n, 279 S.C. 362, 307
S.E.2d 223 (1983); Strickland v. Prudential Ins. Co., 278 S.C. 82, 292 S.E.2d 301 (1982)
(dispute over the amount of actual knowledge of the deceased); Brown v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 275 S.C. 276, 269 S.E.2d 769 (1980) (supreme court rejection of trial
judge's finding that the insurance company had unreasonably delayed payment); Madden v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 264, 251 S.E.2d 196 (1979); Baker v. Pilot Life Ins.
Co., 268 S.C. 609, 235 S.E.2d 300 (1977) (alleged concealment of a significant fact on the
application).
160. 281 S.C. 391, 395-96, 315 S.E.2d 817, 820 (Ct. App. 1984).
161. 264 S.C. 535, 216 S.E.2d 192 (1975); see Trimper v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 540 F.
Supp. 1188 (D.S.C. 1982) (failure to make necessary investigation is grounds for award of
fees); Sciarrone v. Life Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 446, 449, 313 S.E.2d 322, 324 (Ct. App. 1984)
(law was "well established" and there was no "dispute about the facts," except for one
created by defendant's "false declaration under oath"); see also Coker v. Pilot Life Ins.
Co., 265 S.C. 260, 217 S.E.2d 784 (1975) (evidence clearly showed plaintiff was totally
disabled); Houston v. Continental Assurance Co., 269 S.C. 322, 237 S.E.2d 375 (1977);
Thompson v. Home Sec. Life Ins., 271 S.C. 54, 244 S.E.2d 533 (1978) (verdict indicating
that jury had made a finding of breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act).
Flynn v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 281 S.C. 391, 315 S.E.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1984),
does not seem entirely consistent with Thompson, since it regards the judge, not the
jury, as the appropriate finder of fact on this issue. Accord Nichols v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616 (1983) (attorneys' fees under § 38-9-320 are
available only in a breach of contract action with the determination of bad faith to be
made by the trial judge).
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be recovered in a tort action. 162
The trial court decides the issue of attorneys' fees. Accordingly, if the issue is not raised or decided in the lower court, it
will not be considered on appeal.16 3 A judgment is not always
necessary. In Brown v. Johnson6 4 the court reversed a fee award
on the ground that allegations in the complaint and statements
made in arguments before the judge were, by themselves, insufficient to support an award. Nevertheless, the court stated that
to judgment would not necessarily preclude an
settlement prior
16 5
award of fees.
If the trial court allows attorneys' fees, the defendant appeals, and the supreme court affirms the judgment, the court
may award additional attorneys' fees to the plaintiff to cover the
expense of the appeal.166 Since the statute antedates the creation
of the court of appeals, it refers only to the supreme court. Thus,
the issue of attorneys' fees on appeal to the court of appeals has
not been decided by either court. Either respondents have not
requested them or appellants have not challenged whatever requests have been made. Such fees should be allowed since the
purpose of the statute would be defeated if additional fees were
not permitted by the court of appeals. Significantly this section
covers appeals from the judgment, not merely appeals from the
award of fees. In Coker and Blackburn the supreme court allowed additional fees on appeal.
Recovery of attorneys' fees incurred in defending an action
which the insurer refused to defend is an issue that has been
litigated a number of times. Two wholly distinct theories have
been advanced to support a recovery. The first theory stems
from section 38-9-320 itself. If the insurer fails to defend the insured despite an obligation arising from the insurance contract,
the insurer may be liable for the insured's attorneys' fees.167 The
162. Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616 (1983).
163. Gurley v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 279 S.C. 449, 309 S.E.2d 11 (Ct. App.
1983).

164.
165.
166.
167.

276 S.C. 68, 275 S.E.2d 876 (1981).
Id. at 71-72, 275 S.E.2d at 877-78.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320(2) (1976).
Compare Sloan Constr. Co. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 269 S.C. 183, 236 S.E.2d

818 (1977) (fees not awarded; even though first insurer refused to defend action against

its insured, insured's second insurer defended the action; therefore, insured suffered no
loss for which it could hold the first) with Boggs v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 272 S.C.
460, 252 S.E.2d 565 (1979) (fees awarded since suit against contractor was over an "oc-
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insured must demonstrate, however, that he has suffered actual
damage because of the insurer's failure to defend. Thus, in Ferromontan, Inc. v. Georgetown Steel Corp.1"" the insured could
not recover fees from one of his insurers because the other insurer was also obligated to defend the insured under the policy.
An interesting variation on this issue is in Gordon-Gallup
Realtors v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.1 9 In Gordon-Gallup the
insurer informed the insured that the insurer would not defend
it under the policy. The insured then instituted a declaratory
judgment action to compel the insurer to defend the claim
against it. The policy required the insurer to defend the insured
against any claim based on negligence, but specifically excluded
coverage for fraud. The insured was sued in fraud for alleged
misrepresentation by one of its agents. Although the complaint
alleged fraud, it failed to allege that the supposed misrepresentations had been made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. The court held as follows:
Knowing a [sic] reckless falsity is an essential element of fraud.
It is the absence of this element which distinguishes fraud
from mere negligent misrepresentations .... Since the policy
expressly covers negligence and the facts alleged ... create a

reasonable possibility of recovery under that theory, we hold
...[that the insurer] had a duty to defend. 170
Clearly an insurer cannot rely on the actual claim stated in the
complaint, but is under a duty to analyze the complaint and determine if the facts alleged could support a recovery on a claim
the insurer would be required to defend, even if that claim is not
171
asserted by the complainant.

The Gordon-Gallup court relied on Hegler v.Gulf Insur-

currence" covered by the policy; insurer's refusal to defend was therefore unreasonable,

and contractor settled suit in a reasonable manner).
168. 535 F. Supp. 1198 (D.S.C. 1982).
169. 274 S.C. 468, 265 S.E.2d 38 (1980).

170. Id. at 471, 265 S.E.2d at 40 (citations omitted).
171. This duty seems to be a rather heavy burden to place on the insurance company since it requires the insurer to interpret the allegations of the complaint to determine all possible causes of action such allegations could support. A fairer allocation of
the burden would require the insured to defend to the extent of having the complaint
amended to state a claim that is covered by the policy and then requiring the insurer to
assume the burden of defense.
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ance Co.1 72 Hegler affirmed the right to attorneys' fees when an

insurance company seeks to avoid its contractual liability to defend; however, it affirmed under an entirely different theory
than that used in similar cases. In Hegler the company defended
the insured but simultaneously initiated a declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend
the insured. The lower court found in favor of the insured but
refused to award attorneys' fees. Without reference to section
38-9-320, the supreme court reversed, holding that "[t]he legal
fees incurred by appellant. . . were damages arising directly as
'173
a result of [respondent's] breach of the contract.

Two other points merit comment about recovery of attorneys' fees from insurers. First, the award cannot exceed onethird of the judgment or $2500, whichever is less. 174 Second, the
supreme court has upheld the attorneys' fees provisions as con1 75
stitutional in Coker v. Pilot Life Insurance Co.

20. Violations of the Motor Club Services Act
The Motor Club Services Act 76 allows for a discretionary
award of attorneys' fees to any plaintiff injured by a violation of
the Act or any regulations promulgated under it if he prevails in
a civil suit for damages. 7 7 No cases have construed this section.
21.

Unfair Trade Practices

Section 39-5-14017s mandates an award of attorneys' fees to
a prevailing plaintiff in an action based on the commission of
unfair trade practices. Plaintiffs can maintain only actions for
"ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal.

' 179

No

172. 270 S.C. 548, 243 S.E.2d 443 (1978).

173. Id. at 550-51, 243 S.E.2d at 444. Compare authority cited supra note 167.
174. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320(1) (1976).
175. 265 S.C. 260, 217 S.E.2d 784 (1975).
176. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-50-10 to -200 (1976).

177. Id. § 38-50-200.
178. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (1976).

179. Section 39-5-140 refers to reader to § 39-5-20, which makes unlawful "[uinfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts of practice in the conduct of any
trade or commerce." Id. § 39-5-20. Section 39-5-20 is a masterpiece of vagueness and
ambiguity which will insure that any person or entity sued for anything that has any
relationship with trade or commerce will also be sued for committing an unfair trade
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cases have construed the section. Although willfulness or knowledge that the act in question violated section 39-5-20 is necessary for recovery of treble damages, neither is necessary to receive attorneys' fees: the mere finding of a violation itself is
sufficient. s0
The Attorney General has stated that an action under this
section can be brought in magistrate's court provided that the
amount in controversy (i.e., the treble damages) do not exceed
that court's jurisdiction.' The attorneys' fees sought, however,
are not part of the jurisdictional amount.
22. Overcharging by Warehousemen
Chapter 19 of title 39 regulates warehouses and warehousemen. 82 Section 39-19-220183 sets maximum rates for handling
and selling leaf tobacco and requires that bills plainly state the
amount charged.
Section 39-19-2908" allows a person who is overcharged in
violation of this section to maintain an action to collect the
overcharges, a two hundred dollar penalty, court costs, and attorneys' fees. The violation, however, must be willful. Because
the section requires willfulness, Southeastern Home should not
bar recovery of such fees."8 5
23. Business Opportunity Sales Act Violations
The Code provides: "Any purchaser injured by a violation of
this chapter [chapter 57 of the South Carolina Business Opportunity Sales Act] or by the business opportunity seller's breach
of a contract or any obligation arising therefrom may bring an
action for recovery of damages, including reasonable attorneys'
practice.
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-5-140(a) (1976). The court of appeals has recently limited
the scope of the Unfair Trade Practices Act to disputes which implicate the public interest. See Noack Enters. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc., 290 S.C.
475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1986).
181. 1980 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 5, No. 80-1.
182. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-19-10 to -290 (1976).
183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-19-220 (1976).
184. Id. § 39-19-290.
185. See Southeastern Home Bldg. & Refurbishing, Inc. v. Platt, 283 S.C. 302, 325
S.E.2d 328 (1985).
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fees."" The court in Tousley v. North American Van Lines18
upheld the constitutionality of the Business Opportunity Sales
Act. The court rejected arguments that the Act was preempted
by the Federal Interstate Commerce Act' 18 and that the Act impermissibly burdened interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause."8 9 It should be noted that a violation of the
Act is defined to be an unfair trade practice. 9 0 An award of attorneys' fees can be made either under section 39-57-80(b) or
under section 39-5-140(a). The latter is preferable since section
39-57-80(b), while allowing a purchaser to bring an action for
"damages, including reasonable attorneys' fees," does not contain the mandatory language found in section 39-5-140(a).
24. Franchise Agreements Involving Farm Implements
Title 39, chapter 59, of the Code allows one injured in business or property by a violation of chapter 59 to recover costs and
attorneys' fees in an action for damages or injunctive relief.19 1
The violation must be by the commission of an unfair or deceptive trade practice, or the injury must result from a refusal "to
accede to a proposal for an arrangement which, if consummated,
is in violation of this chapter. 11 9 2 The action described in this
section can be maintained without regard to any other remedy
available or the provisions of any agreement, including one containing a waiver of a right to bring the action.1 93
25.

Knowing Purchase of Stolen Metal

A dealer' 94 in precious metals who knowingly purchases stolen metal is civilly liable to the true owner for three times the
value of the metal and "shall be liable for a reasonable attorneys' fee as the court in its discretion may award."'1 9 5 It is un186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

§ 39-57-80(b) (1976).
752 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 100-03.
Id. at 103.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-57-80(e) (1976).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-59-120 (1976).
Id.
Id.
"Dealer" is defined in S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-54-10(1) (1976).
Id. § 40-54-70 (emphasis added).
S.C. CODE ANN.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss4/7

34

1987]

et al.: Recovery of Attorneys' Fees as Costs or Damages in South Carolina
ATTORNEYS' FEES

clear whether the award is mandatory and the amount discretionary or whether the court has the discretion both to make the
award and set the amount.
26. Private Personnel Agencies
The South Carolina Private Personnel Placement Services
proscribes certain activities and conduct engaged in by
personnel agencies and their employees 97 and by employers or
persons seeking employment. 9" The statute creates a civil cause
of action but only for knowing violations. 9 9 If a knowing violation occurs, anyone adversely affected by the violation can recover treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. 00
Act 9l

27. Right to Work
The "right to work" is generally an emotional issue with
strong political overtones. The South Carolina Legislature has

left no doubt as to which side of the issue it supports."0 ' Any
person adversely affected by anything done or threatened to be
done in violation of the right-to-work chapter may be entitled to
an impressive variety of remedies including actual damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. 02
28. Licensed Dealers in Agricultural Products
Section 46-41-70203 covers proceedings on a complaint of

breach of the conditions of a bond or any other injurious practice or transaction by a licensed dealer in agricultural products.
The section begins by referring to "any person" claiming to be
196. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-25-10 to -110 (1976).
197. Id. §§ 41-25-50, -60 (and possibly -80).
198. Id. § 41-25-70.

199. Id. §§ 41-25-100, -110(h). The statute is silent regarding negligent or otherwise
unknowing violations. The use of "knowing" in both §§ 41-25-90 (penalties) and 41-25100 (civil actions) suggests that there is no liability for violations which are not done
knowingly: e.g., agency informs employee that files are confidential, but negligently allows employee or former employee to use a file improperly.
200. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-25-100(a) (1976).
201. Id. §§ 41-7-10 to -90.
202. Id. § 41-7-90.
203. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-41-70 (1976).
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injured, but shifts to "producer" when dealing with the institution of a civil action. 20 4 The structure of the statute, however,

suggests that the "producer" referred to in the latter half is the
"any person" referred to at the beginning. Two interpretations
are possible: Either the change is inadvertent and unintentional
or it embodies a deliberate policy choice to allow any person to
file a complaint with the Commissioner but allows only producers to institute civil actions following a decision by the Commissioner. The first interpretation seems more plausible. A deliberate attempt to narrow the covered class would likely be
introduced by language making clear the intent (e.g., "The complainant, if he is a producer ...

").

The plaintiff must file a complaint with the Commissioner
before attempting to institute a civil action. If the Commissioner
rules in favor of the complainant, either the Commissioner or
the complainant-producer can file an action to enforce the ruling
if the dealer has not complied within fifteen days. If the complainant files an action in which he prevails, he can recover attorneys' fees. If the complainant does not prevail, however, the
dealer is not allowed any fees. If the Commissioner rules against
the complainant-producer, the latter may still institute an action. In this case, however, fees will be awarded to whoever
prevails, whether complainant or dealer. The award of attorneys'
05
fees, when provided for, is mandatory.
29.

Violations of the Mountain Ridge Protection Act

The South Carolina Mountain Ridge Protection Act of
1984206 prohibits the construction of tall buildings and structures on protected mountain ridges. 0 7 The Act also prohibits

the alteration of existing buildings if the alteration would cause
a violation of section 48-49-40.2°s Section 48-49-60(b) 20 9 creates a

private right of action for damages or injunctive relief, or both,
in favor of any person injured by a (iolation of the chapter or
any person residing in the county in which the violation has oc204. Id.
205. Id.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-49-10 to -80 (1976).
207. Id. § 48-49-40. Definitions are provided in § 48-49-30.
208. Id. § 48-49-50.
209. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 48-49-60(b) (1976).

206. S.C.
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curred. The court has discretion to award costs of litigation, including fees for attorneys and expert witnesses, to any party in
the suit. No provision limits an award to a prevailing party.
30. Coercing Employees to Work on Sundays
In order to make certain that owners of businesses understand that they cannot force employees who are "conscientious
objector[s] to Sunday work" to work on Sundays, the legislature
treated a private cause of action in favor of employees who are
dismissed or demoted because of their refusal to work on Sunday or Saturday and did so not once, but twice. 210 Both sections

provide for treble damages, court costs, and attorneys' fees. Both
sections refer to section 53-1_100,211 which repeats the prohibi-

tion against penalizing persons who refuse to work on Sunday.
The legislature attempted to sidestep the obvious First Amendment issue by carefully avoiding any mention of religious bases
for refusal to work on Sunday and prohibiting discrimination
against anyone with an unspecified "conscientious" objection to
Sunday work. Whether this transparent device will protect the
statute from constitutional attack is doubtful. It is difficult to
conceive of a nonreligious conscientious objection to working on
Sundays. The statute creates equal protection problems as well:
no protection is given to have a conscientious objection to working on Saturdays.
31. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers,Distributors,and Dealers
Using language that closely tracks that used in the South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act,212 chapter 15 of title 56 de-

clares unfair or deceptive acts by those covered by the chapter
are unlawful. 2 13 The major difference between the two acts is

210. S.C. CODE ANN.

§§

53-1-5, -150 (Supp. 1986). Sections 53-1-5 (excluding the

first sentence) and 53-1-150(c) are identical except for a reference to the 1976 Code in
the latter.
211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-100 (Supp. 1986).
212. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (1976).
213. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-30 (1976). The parallel is noted in Crystal, Consumer

Product Warranty Litigation in South Carolina, 31 S.C.L. REV. 293, 352 (1980). The
section also refers the courts to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982
& Supp. III 1985), although in somewhat different language than that used in § 39-520(b). The parallels suggest that court decisions under § 39-5-20 should be highly per-
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that section 56-15-409(a) refers to acts and practices "as defined
in [s]ection 56-15-40." The Unfair Trade Practices Act does not
define what acts are unfair trade practices. This reference creates a theoretical possibility that an act which would be an unfair trade practice under section 39-5-20 might not be actionable
under section 56-15-30 because it is not covered in section 56-1540. Given the comprehensiveness of section 56-15-40, this problem is likely to arise infrequently, if ever. If both section 39-5-20
and section 56-15-40 are applicable, the facts of each case would
determine under which section a plaintiff would prefer to proceed. Violations of title 56, chapter 15, carry with them
mandatory double damages and attorneys' fees. 14 No showing of
knowledge or willfulness is necessary. On the other hand, recovery is limited to damages for injuries to business or property
only. 21 5 In addition, the court can only award treble damages in

the form of punitive damages if the jury finds the defendant acted maliciously. 18 This standard is higher than that required by
the unfair trade practices
statute. No cases construe the attor2 17
provision.
fees
neys'
32. Condemnation by the South Carolina Highway
Department
Under section 57-5-32021s a property owner can recover at-

torneys' fees from the South Carolina Highway Department in a
condemnation proceeding, but only if the Department abandons
the proceeding "after condemnation, trial, and rendition of verdict by jury." Both the structure of the statute and scant South
Carolina case law seem to mandate that if the department abandons the proceeding at any time prior to rendition of a verdict,
suasive in interpreting liability under § 56-15-30.
214. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110(1) (1976).
215. Id.
216. Id. § 56-15-110(3). Even then, treble damages may not be awarded; they are
merely the upper limit of any award of punitive damages. One interesting issue that has

not been addressed is whether a plaintiff could recover double damages under sub-section (1) and punitive damages (equal to three times the actual damages) under subsec-

tion (3). Cf. Tousley v. North Am. Van Lines, 752 F.2d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1985) (pyramiding of damages is inappropriate unless expressly provided for by the legislature).

217. The statute was applied in Riddle v. Pitts, 283 S.C. 387, 324 S.E.2d 59 (1984),
but there was no mention of a claim or of an award of attorneys' fees.
218. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-5-320 (1976).
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the owner would be precluded from recovering expenses. 19 Additionally, any verdict received by a private party could not be
entered as a judgment against the Highway Department.2 2 °
33. Actions Involving Public Services, Utilities, and Carriers
Two provisions in title 58 allow a private citizen to maintain
actions for improper construction of a telephone or telegraph
wire 221 and for the failure of operators of electric railways or passenger-carrying electric cars 22 2 to perform any duty required of
them by specified sections of title 58. In both statutes, the citizen sues not for damages, but for a statutory penalty. If he
prevails, he is reimbursed for his expenses, including attorneys'
fees. Any additional amount recovered goes into the county
223
treasury.
34. South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) Generally
Provisions for awards of attorneys' fees are included in the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
(a) For
failure of party giving notice of deposition to
224
attend;
(b) for failure of party giving notice of deposition of a wit225
ness to secure a necessary subpoena;
(c) for expenses incurred by another party in obtaining an
226
order compelling discovery;

219. See Ex parte Savannah River Elec. Co., discussed supra at notes 53-55. The
Highway Department apparently has the broader rights of abandonment conferred by
Savannah River Electric to condemnation proceedings covered by § 28-1-30 rather than
the narrower rights conferred by §§ 28-3-100 and 28-11-30.
220. For a discussion of other condemnation proceedings, see supra subpt. 111.9.
South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Schrimpf, 242 S.C. 357, 131 S.E.2d 44 (1963); see also
supra note 64.
221. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2020 (1976).
222. Id. § 58-21-50.
223. The penalty for improper construction of wires is only five dollars per day; the
penalty of electric railway violations is $250 per day. Under § 58-21-60, § 58-21-50 is
inapplicable to any electric interurban railway more than 50 miles long.
224. S.C.R. Civ. P. 30(g)(1).
225. Id. R. 30(g)(2).
226. Id. R. 37(a)(4).
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(d) for expenses 22
incurred
due to failure to obey an order
7
compelling discovery;
(e) for expenses incurred in proving truth or genuineness
following2 a failure to make an admission regarding same under
rule 36; 16
(f) for expenses incurred because of a party's failure to attend his own deposition
or to respond to interrogatories or re229
quests for inspection;
(g) for failure to participate in good faith in the framing of
230
a discovery plan;
(h) for presentation of affidavits in bad faith or solely for
the purpose of delay in a summary judgment motion;23 1 or
(i) for expenses of the prevailing party in procuring a re22
medial writ.
One should pay attention to what, under each provision,
constitutes a "failure" justifying an award of fees and who is liable for fees if an award is made.
(b)

Damages Caused by Injunction

Under the 1976 Code, if a plaintiff received an injunction
(presumably a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order) and the court ultimately determined that the plaintiff is
not entitled to the injunction, that plaintiff is liable to the party
enjoined for damages that resulted from the injunction. 3 The
damages recoverable included attorneys' fees involved in obtaining a dissolution of the injunction.23 4 Fees are not recoverable in two cases: First, if the injunction is only ancillary to the
principal controversy and was never actually dissolved but
merely terminated upon rendering of a final judgment in favor
of the enjoined party in the main controversy; 23 5 and second, if
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. R. 37(b).
Id. R. 37(c).
Id. R. 37(d).
Id. R. 37(e).
Id. R. 56(g).

232. Id. R. 65(f)(2).
233. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-55-60 (1976).

234. Chambers v. Long, 132 S.C. 179, 128 S.E. 853 (1925).
235. Garlington v. Copeland, 43 S.C. 389, 21 S.E. 317 (1895). Copeland obtained a
judgment against one George Young. A levy was executed on Young's land. Copeland
then sued Garlington, asking for an injunction restraining the sale of Young's lands until
the dispute between him and Copeland could be settled. The trial court granted the
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the fees involved in obtaining the dissolution are indistinguishable from those incurred in the principal controversy.2 3 Section
15-55-60 was repealed when the new rules were enacted.23 7 Since
South Carolina rule 65(c) 23 8 contains a similar provision for

damages, the cases cited herein are probably still valid.
(c)

Mandamus

Rule 65(f)(2)239 allowed recovery of such damages, including
attorneys' fees, that could have been recovered under prior law.
Recovery of damages and costs was permitted under the Code in
proceedings involving mandamus, 240 quo warranto, and scire

facias s41 South Carolina courts have held that attorneys' fees
242
may be recoverable in a mandamus proceeding.
35. Landlord and Tenant Disputes

243
The South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act

became effective on March 10, 1986. The Act establishes rights
and obligations for both landlords and tenants and creates new
causes of action to enforce those obligations. The Act states that
rental agreements cannot contain certain provisions.2 4 If a landlord deliberately uses an agreement that contains any prohibited
provision, and the landlord "attempts to exercise the rights created by the agreement," the tenant can recover actual damages
injunction. Copeland ultimately prevailed in the dispute with Garlington, but the supreme court nevertheless held that the injuncticn had been proper. 43 S.C. at 398, 21
S.E. at 320.
236. Hill v. Thomas, 19 S.C. 230 (1883).
237. See 1985 S.C. Acts 277, No. 100, § 2.
238. S.C.R. Civ. P. 65(c).
239. S.C.R. Civ. P. 65(f)(2).
240. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-63-150 (1976).
241. Id. § 15-63-160.
242. Compare State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co., 164 S.C. 208, 162 S.E.
74 (1931) (fees allowed in part) with Pressley v. Nunnery, 169 S.C. 509, 169 S.E. 413
(1933) (no fees allowed because defendant, a superintendent of education, was motivated
wholly by honest belief that he was acting in accord with his duty).
243. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-10 to -940 (Supp. 1986).
244. A rental agreement may not provide that the tenant do the following: (1) Agree
to waive or forego rights or remedies under this act; (2) authorize any person to confess
judgment on a claim arising out of the rental agreement; or (3) agree to the exculpation
or limitation of any liability of the landlord arising under law or to indemnify the landlord for that liability or the costs connected therewith. Id. § 27-40-330(a).
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(not to exceed the security deposit) and attorneys' fees. If the
use of an agreement containing prohibited provisions is "malicious," 245 the tenant may recover actual damages, attorneys'
fees, and an amount not to exceed three months' rent. 46
The Act also provides for attorneys' fees if the landlord does
any of the following: (1) Unlawfully refuses to return prepaid
rents, 4 7 (2) willfully fails to comply with the rental agreement, 4 8 (3) willfully and unlawfully fails to return security upon
termination of the rental agreement,2 49 (4) willfully and in bad
faith refuses to deliver possession,250 (5) willfully or.negligently
fails to provide essential services,25 1 (5) unlawfully removes or
excludes the tenant from the premises or constructively evicts
him by a diminution of essential services,2 52 (7) knowingly makes
an unlawful entry, repeated lawful entries in an unreasonable
manner, or repeated demands for entry in a harassing manner,2 53
or (8) retaliates against the tenant for engaging in conduct pro254
tected by the Act.
Other provisions allow a landlord to recover attorneys' fees
from the tenant. The landlord may recover fees if the tenant
does any of the following: (1) Raises a meritless defense not
raised in good faith in a suit by the landlord for possession
based on nonpayment of rent, 5 (2) willfully fails to comply with
the rental agreement (for noncompliance other than failure to
pay rent),2 56 (3) refuses to pay rent and the refusal is not in good

245. Id. § 27-40-330(b).
246. Id. It is not clear whether the landlord becomes subject to these penalties when
he attempts to enforce any provision (including a provision that is, in itself, wholly acceptable) in an agreement containing a prohibited provision or only if he attempts to
enforce the prohibited provision itself. The structure of the section suggests that the
former is the correct reading; if the legislature had intended the second interpretation, it
could have simply stated the following language: "[A]nd attempts to exercise the rights
created by the prohibited provision."
247. Id. § 27-40-410(b).
248. Id. § 27-40-610(b).
249. Id. § 27-40-610(c).
250. Id. § 27-40-620(b).
251. Id. § 27-40-630(a)(2). "Essential services" are defined in § 27-40-440 of the Act.
252. Id. § 27-40-660.
253. Id. § 27-40-780(b).
254. Id. § 27-40-910(h). "Protected conduct" is described in § 27-40-910(a).
255. Id. § 27-40-640(a).
256. Id. § 27-40-710(c).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss4/7

42

et al.: Recovery of Attorneys'
Fees as Costs or Damages in South Carolina
1987]
ATTORNEYS' FEES

faith,2 51 (4) breaches the rental agreement so as to terminate it

or give the landlord the right to terminate it,2 58 (5) holds over in
willful violation of the Act or the rental agreement or does not
hold over in good faith,2"' (6) or raises a meritless defense of
unlawful retaliatory conduct.2 60

IV.

NONSTATUTORY RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
1. Contract

Attorneys' fees are recoverable if expressly provided for in a
contract between parties. In Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina
Public Service Commission26 ' the court held that a promise implied or created through promissory estoppel does not create a
contract under which one party can become obligated to pay the
other's attorneys' fees.
2. Damages
Attorneys' fees may sometimes be recoverable as damages.
If, for example, A sues B and B cross-claims against C, B can
recover from C his litigation expenses incurred in the dispute
with A. B may not, however, recover any expenses resulting from
this litigation with C. Under these facts, the court in Campus
26 2
Sweater and Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Construction Co.

held that B's attorneys' fees incurred in the litigation against A
were recoverable as consequential damages.
257. Id.
258. Id. § 27-40-750.
259. Id. § 27-40-770(c).
260. Id. § 27-40-910(b). The section states that if the defense is without merit, the
landlord can recover attorneys' fees. If the defense is raised in bad faith, the landlord
may recover up to three month's rent or treble the actual damages, whichever is greater.
Arguably, attorneys' fees cannot be recovered if a defense is raised in bad faith. In other
sections, imposing sanctions for the manner in which the proscribed conduct is engaged,
the statute repeats the attorneys' fees provision for each type of conduct. See, e.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-330, -770 (Supp. 1986). In addition, the statute does not (here or in
some of the other relevant sections) state whether the various sanctions can all be imposed for a defense that is (to use § 27-40-910(b) as an example) both meritless and
raised in bad faith. The issue is certain to arise since a defense which fits in one category
will often fit into the other as well.
261. 284 S.C. 81, 326 S.E.2d 395 (1985).
262. 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981).
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If an insurer brings an action for declaratory judgment in an
effort to avoid its liability to defend the insured against a thirdexpenses
party's claim and if the insured prevails, the insured's
3
in the proceeding are consequential damages.1
The court denied recovery of attorneys' fees as damages in
Prickett v. A & B Electrical Service, Inc.264 After being sued on
an account owed, Prickett cross-claimed against Alexander. Alexander then counterclaimed, alleging fraud and deceit and
seeking, inter alia, the expenses involved in defending against
Prickett's cross-claim. The court of appeals held that Alexander
he could not rehad suffered no compensable damages and that 265
cover attorneys' fees as consequential damages.
3. Common Fund
A court may award attorneys' fees in a common fund action.
This award is not dependent upon the statutory provision on
partition. 6 In order to be compensated from the common fund,
an attorney must show that "his services

. . .

aided in creating,

preserving, or protecting the fund" that his "services proved
263. Hegler v. Gulf Ins. Co., 270 S.C. 548, 243 S.E.2d 443 (1978).
264. 280 S.C. 123, 311 S.E.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1984).
265. The headnotes interpret the case as holding that because there were no compensable damages suffered, Alexander could not recover attorneys' fees, thus leaving
open by implication the possibility that had he suffered additional, compensable damages, he might have recovered the fees. This interpretation is inconsistent with Hegler v.
Gulf Insurance Co., 270 S.C. 548, 243 S.E.2d 443 (1978), and Rimer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742 (1966).
In Hegler the plaintiff's sole damages were the legal expenses incurred in litigating
the defendant insurer's declaratory judgment action. (The insurer had agreed to defend
the plaintiff against the third party's claim pending the outcome of its action, and it did
so.) The South Carolina Supreme Court nevertheless awarded counsel fees and other
expenses.
The sole authority on this issue cited by the court of appeals in Prickett was Rimer.
The citation from Rimer and the use of that case by the court of appeals indicates that
the dispositive consideration on the attorneys' fees issue was not the presence or lack of
additional compensable damages, but simply the general rule that when one person sues
another, whether by complaint or cross-claim, attorneys' fees are not recoverable. Such a
conclusion is reinforced by the court's suggestion that if Alexander had prevailed on a
malicious prosecution theory, "the rule might be different." Prickett,280 S.C. at 126, 311
S.E.2d at 403. This interpretation of Prickett makes the case consistent with both Hegler
(recovery allowed because institution of the action by the insurer was in itself a breach of
contract) and Campus Sweater (recovery allowed for B against C but only for those
expenses involved in the action between A and B).
266. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-110 (1976).
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fruitful to the general class," and that there is "a contract of
employment, either expressly made or superinduced by the law
upon the facts. 28 7 In Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Elmwood Properties2 8 the court awarded the plaintiff attorneys'
fees from the common fund of the debtor's assets after maintaining a successful action to set aside as fraudulent two judgments obtained against the debtor. In Shillito v. City of Spartanburg 26 the court followed common fund principles and
applied them to public funds.
4.

Conduct on the Part of Parties or Attorneys

In Segall v. Shore271 the supreme court affirmed a master's
award of $185,000 (and added $15,000 to compensate for the
costs of appeal) in attorneys' fees after adopting the master's
finding that the "duty and burden of accounting [in this matter
rest upon the defendants. They, however,] have not come forward in a positive way to account, and have appeared to adopt
the position that their only duty was to respond to [specific] requests . . .; even in this regard, their response has been
'27
lacking." '
In Patterson v. Bogan 2 the court held that the plaintiff's
expenses, including attorney fees, in defending himself against a
charge of larceny based on the malicious signing of a warrant by
defendants was properly considered in determining the amount
of actual damages the plaintiff suffered. Patterson was distinguished in Truett v. Georgeson,7 3 in which the court held that a
technical error in the issuance of a warrant was insufficient to
support a claim of malicious prosecution and that the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover the attorneys' fees he had expended.

267. Caughman v. Caughman, 247 S.C. 104, 110-11, 146 S.E.2d 93, 96 (1965) (quoting Petition of Crum, 196 S.C. 528, 14 S.E.2d 21 (1941)).
268. 244 S.C. 588, 138 S.E.2d 38 (1964).
269. 214 S.C. 11, 51 S.E.2d 95 (1948).
270. 269 S.C. 31, 236 S.E.2d 316 (1977).
271. Id. at 40, 236 S.E.2d at 320.
272. 261 S.C. 87, 198 S.E.2d 586 (1973).
273. 273 S.C. 661, 258 S.E.2d 499 (1979).
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5. Miscellaneous Cases
27 4 involved a suit
Farmersand Merchants Bank v. Fargnoli
on promissory notes in which an attorneys' fee of ten percent
was set by the trial court without taking evidence on the issue.
The court affirmed the award but did not state whether a contract provision was involved.
Roberts v. Lawrence275 involved an action by laborers and
materialmen on a highway contractor's bond. The bond provided
for attorneys' fees but named only the State Highway Department as obligee. The court held that since the Highway Department could have recovered attorneys' fees if it had sued to enforce liability under the bond to providers of labor and
materials, "no sound reason appears to hold that the enforcement of the same liability by [the providers] in a direct action,
which they have a right to do, would place them in a less favored
collection of attorneys' fees than the Highway
position as to the
6

Department.

27

In Shipp v. Richardson Corp.277 the court held that an
award of four hundred dollars for attorneys' fees to the defendants following the granting, over objection, of the plaintiff's motion for voluntary nonsuit was patently inadequate since there
had been substantial trial preparation (including contesting several motions). Another reason noted was the possibility of a second trial.
In Addy v. Bolton2 78 the court stated that "in actions of indemnity, brought where the duty to indemnify is either implied
by law or arises under contract, and, no personal fault of the
indemnitee has joined in causing the injury, reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in resisting the claim indemnified against
may be recovered as part of the damages and expenses.

'279

In

Baptist Church v. Southern Mutual Insurance
Emmanuel
280
Co.

the court found Addy "clearly distinguishable" and thus

inapplicable.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278,
279.
280.

274 S.C. 23, 260 S.E.2d 185 (1979).
243 S.C. 158, 133 S.E.2d 74 (1963).
Id. at 161, 133 S.E.2d at 76.
285 S.C. 460, 330 S.E.2d 291 (1985).
257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E.2d 708 (1971).
Id. at 33, 183 S.E.2d at 710.
259 S.C. 223, 233, 191 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1972).
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6.

Costs and Attorneys' Fees

As noted above,28 ' the statutes have not adopted consistent
usage of the term "costs." Sometimes the statutes refer to
"costs, including attorneys' fees." This conceptual inconsistency
is generally irrelevant in determining whether a statute permits
an award of attorneys' fees. Problems in interpreting a statute
that refers only to costs necessarily arise. Unfortunately, the
South Carolina Supreme Court has provided two contradictory
answers. In Sentry Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. Mariner's Cay Development Corp.2" 2 the court held that Code section 29-5-410 permits a recovery of attorneys' fees in certain circumstances not here relevant.2 8 3 The court's reasoning in
support of this contention is not persuasive since the result in
Sentry Engineering cannot be reconciled with the order in
Steinert v. Lanter.28 4 In Steinert the court stated,
We note with concern that the defendants by their motion seek
to recover attorneys' fees as well as costs. At common law, each
party bore its own costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees. Section
15-21-10 is therefore in derogation of the common law and
must be strictly construed. The statute allows the recovery of
costs, not costs and attorneys' fees, and we so hold.28 5
Despite this unequivocal statement, the Sentry Engineering
court, less than eleven months later, did precisely what it chided
defendant Lanter for doing: it read a recovery of attorneys' fees
into a statute that "allows the recovery of costs, not costs and
attorneys' fees. '288 Although the mechanics' lien statute refers to
"the costs, in all other respects, ' 2 7 this reference cannot be used
to distinguish the cases. Section 29-5-410 follows a section that

281. See supra note 17.
282. 287 S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985).
283. See generally supra subpt. 111.10(c). The holding in Sentry Engineeringis nar-

row: it only applies to cases in which there has been arbitration, litigation, and a demand
for fees pursuant to § 29-5-410.

284. 284 S.C. 65, 325 S.E.2d 532 (1985). Leaving aside for the moment the fact that
the legislature almost certainly would not have included both provisions specifically covering attorneys' fees and a provision covering costs which was intended to include attor-

neys' fees but doesn't mention them. See supra subpt. III.10(c).
285. 284 S.C. at 66, 325 S.E.2d at 533.
286. Id.
287. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-5-410 (1976).
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deals with an award of costs in cases in which a creditor commences a suit before his right of action accrues. The suit is then
carried on by another creditor pursuant to section 29-5-390.
Thus, the reference to "the costs, in all other respects" means
the "costs in all cases except those covered by section 29-5-400."
Section 29-5-400 mentions only costs, 288 not costs and attorneys'

fees. Therefore, the Steinert rule, this section should not be read
to allow a recovery of attorneys' fees.
Even if it can be argued that section 29-5-410 is not to be
construed as being a residual exception to section 29-5-400, the
section standing alone does not authorize an award of attorneys'
fees. For something to be a "cost" in some "other respect" it
must first qualify as a cost. The grammatical structure of the
sentence indicates that "in all other respects" is a phrase of limitation making the section apply to only some of the things that
qualify as costs; it is not a phrase of expansion that is designed
to broaden the concept of "costs." Again, Steinert compels the
conclusion that section 29-5-410 does not allow for a recovery of
attorneys' fees. The Sentry Engineering opinion, however, does
not even mention (much less attempt to distinguish) Steinert.
The Steinert rule is consistent with 150 years of South Carolina law. If it is to be overturned by the courts, it should be
overturned completely and accompanied by a complete analysis
of the policies involved. It should not be abandoned in part by
reading an allowance of attorneys' fees into a statute that clearly
does not intend to permit such an allowance.

288. Id. § 29-5-400.
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